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that this Court reverse the 
District Court's ruling that the Permanent Easement Agreement at issue in this case did not 
successfully convey a permanent easement to Boise Hollow's predecessor-in-interest and that any 
interest which had been conveyed had since been extinguished. To the extent that the District Court 
also held that any still-existing easement created by the Permanent Easement Agreement may not be 
expanded to meet the requirements of the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) for a public road, 
and dedicated to ACHD as a public road, Appellants also request that the Court reverse such ruling. 
This brief is submitted by Appellants in reply to RESPONDENT'S BRIEF submitted by 
Respondent City of Boise City ("City") on November 18, 2016, and in further support of 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF submitted October 21, 2016. 
As in the Appellant's Brief, the Clerk's Record on Appeal is cited herein as "R.;" the 
Reporter's Transcript on Appeal is cited as "Tr.;" and the exhibits admitted at the trial are cited as 
"Ex." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
Appellants reply to the City's arguments as follows: 
A. The rationales underlying the general rules relied upon by the City are the very same 
rationales which compel an exception under the unique circumstances present in this case. 
B. All issues raised by Appellants were first raised below and are now properly before this 
Court. 
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easement 
Permanent Easement Agreement were both valid and enforceable. 
The only interpretation of the Permanent Easement Agreement which gives effect to both 
Paragraph I and Paragraph 6 is that the easement area may be expanded by Boise Hollow to 
meet ACHD's requirements and then be dedicated to ACHD as a public road. 
E. The parties agree that the District Court must consider the parol evidence in the record to 
determine the intent of the parties to the Permanent Easement Agreement if this Court finds 
that the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The rationales underlying the general rules relied upon by the City are the very same 
rationales which compel an exception under the unique circumstances present in this 
case. 
The thrust of Appellants' argument that Tee effectively conveyed a permanent easement to 
Van croft is that [ 1] Van croft, as fee title owner Lot 1, consented to its being subject to a permanent 
easement, and [2] the easement was not prevented nor extinguished because at no point has there 
been concurrence of the common law unities. 
Appellants' position is both simple and logical. Consider this scenario: 
• Whiteacre and Blackacre are adjacent. 
• Whiteacre is subject to a 99-year possessory interest held by T. 
• V purchases Whiteacre and Blackacre, but due to T's interest, may only possess 
Blackacre and may not possess Whiteacre. 
• Blackacre is landlocked. 
• V and T agree to an easement across Whiteacre for the benefit of Blackacre. As a result, 
Blackacre is no longer landlocked; it may now properly be made use of. 
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on the other hand, Blackacre and Whiteacre are never unified 
the easement persists as intended, maintaining the 
Blackacre. 
and possession, 
and marketability 
In the foregoing scenario, several important and well-recognized principles are well-served: 
first, there is an "underlying public policy against landlocked properties". MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 
Idaho 1115, 1119, 739 P.2d414, 418 (Ct. App. 1987). Furthermore, "Idaho public policy favors the 
full use oflands". Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,394,210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009). And finally, 
a primary goal of the Court when interpreting contracts is to "if possible, give effect to the intention 
of the parties." See, e.g., Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767,770,450 P.2d 990,993 (1969). 
On balance, the question is whether any important principles are offended. It is here that the 
City's argument falters and, indeed, it is the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Leicht.fuss v. 
Dabney, 329 Mont. 129, 122 P.3d 1220 (Montana 2005) upon which the City first stumbles. 
1. The purpose of the rule generally prohibiting a lessee from burdening the 
lessor's interest with a permanent easement is to prevent the imposition of a 
burden upon the lessor. Enforcing the rule in this instance would contravene 
this purpose by instead preserving a burden and preventing a benefit to the 
lessor. 
The policy supporting the rule generally prohibiting a lessee from burdening the lessor's 
interest with a permanent easement is that one's land should not be subject to a burden to which the 
owner did not agree. In this case, that same policy compels recognition of the easement which was 
created in order to substantially relieve Van croft of the burden imposed upon Lot 4 when the parties' 
predecessors subjected Lot 1 to a 99-year easement. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
easement estate estate 
is to ensure that cannot impose upon his land a that passes to the 
remainderman or the reversioner." 329 Mont at 142, 122 P .3d at 1229 ( emphasis added). However, 
enforcement of the rule simply doesn't comport with this rationale where doing so instead "prevents 
the benefit of an easement from running to the remaindermanorreversioner." Id at 143, 122 P.3dat 
1230 (emphasis in original). 
The City's argument omits this point, as well as the Montana Supreme Court discussion of 
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4 .1 ( 1): "it is the intent or expectations of the parties to 
the servitude which determine the duration thereof. . .. 'A servitude should be interpreted to give 
effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the 
circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was 
created.' " Id at 143-44, 122 P.3d at 1230 (discussing, and then quoting Restatement (Third) of 
Property, Servitudes§ 4.1(1), at 496-97 (emphasis added by court). 
The Leichtfuss Court's nuanced consideration of the issue reveals that permitting Tee to grant 
V ancroft a permanent easement over Lot 1 in this instance does not run afoul of the principle 
underlying the general rule. To the contrary, that principle and others can only be served by 
recognizing the permanence of the easement. 
With that in mind, we turn to the other rule which, in this instance, demands adherence to the 
spirit over the letter. 
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prohibiting a ..,.., .. Lili-. an easement over 
own supports the as here, the 
landowner never has the opportunity to ornssei;s 
own land is not implicated in this case because V ancroft never held concurrent ownership and 
possession of both Lot I and Lot 4. 1 
Appellants' argument relies on a very simple logic: [1] the rule preventing a landowner from 
having an easement in his own land is derived from the doctrine of merger; [2] the doctrine of 
merger operates only when the dominant and servient parcels come under common ownership and 
possession; 2 and [3] since V ancroft never had possession of the servient parcel, neither the rule nor 
its purpose is called upon. 
Notably, the City declines to respond to the foregoing argument. 3 Instead, the City focuses 
its attention upon Johnson v. Gustqfson, 49 Idaho 376, 288 P. 427 (1930), wherein, as stated in 
Appellant's Brief at p.23, this Court first adopted the rule that "one cannot have an easement in his 
own lands." The City rightly states that the facts of Johnson "are complete different from our 
case ... " Respondent's Brief at 19. Again, however, the City's narrow gaze captures only the letter 
of the rule, irrespective of its underlying purpose. This perspective is too limited to be useful in this 
case. The applicability of Johnson is simply in this Court's long-standing view that an easement 
1 In fact, no party has ever had concurrent ownership and possession of Lot land Lot 4 since before Tee and Vancroft 
entered in the Permanent Easement Agreement. 
2 See, e.g., Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d 403,406 (1961). 
3 Qui tacet non utique fatetur, sed tam en verum est eum non neg are: He who is silent does not indeed confess, but yet it 
is true that he does not deny. 
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common e., title and possession) are broken, 
favor of the use of land become the primary concerns even as against the ownership rights of the 
holder of the servient tenement. This is the premise underlying the doctrine of easement by 
necessity. See, e.g., Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,219,280 P.3d 715, 722 (2012). 
With that in mind, consider again the circumstances of this case. V ancroft took ownership of 
Lot 1 and Lot 4 in 1990, but only possession of the Lot 4. Lot 1 was subject to a pre-existing 99-
year lease not set to expire until 2079. Vancroft did not stand to obtain possession of Lot 1 during 
the lifetimes of its principals. Concurrently, Lot 4 was landlocked and could not be developed in any 
meaningful way without access to 361h Street across Lot 1. Therefore the parties simply acted as any 
other neighbors might act: one granted an access easement to the other. This resolved the 
landlocking and use problems affecting Lot 4, did not unduly burden the ownership rights 
appurtenant to the servient estate, benefited the owner of both the servient and dominant estate, and 
ultimately posed no danger of creating an easement over lands both commonly-owned and 
commonly-possessed because ifVancroft or a successor ever happened to obtain both possession 
and ownership of both lots, the easement would automatically terminate under the doctrine of 
merger. 
Consequently the Court should not perceive the rules oflaw at issue as having prevented the 
easement, nor having later extinguished it when the leasehold ended. The critical fact is that there 
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easement 
The City's argument requires the Court to infer a problem where none exists; Appellants' 
argument invites the Court to recognize the absence of a real dilemma under these facts. 
B. All issues raised by Appellants were first raised below and are now properly before this 
Court. 
1. Appellants argued to the District Court that the City should be estopped from 
denying the existence of a permanent easement over Lot 1 in favor of Lot 4. 
The City argues that Appellants did not preserve their estoppel argument below and have 
asserted it only for the first time on appeal. Respondent's Brief at 22. This is inaccurate; Appellants 
first asserted this argument in PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION To DEFENDANT'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (filed February 2, 2016, R. 000436-52): 
Additionally, when the City took ownership of the Golf Course, it expressly accepted 
the easement and assumed all rights and obligations under the Permanent Easement 
Agreement. The City became the owner of the Golf Course pursuant to a DONATION 
AGREEMENT and DEED OF GIFT, each dated November 1, 2013, (the latter being 
incorporated into the former). True and accurate certified copies of the foregoing 
documents are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B," respectively, to the AFFIDAVIT OF 
COUNSEL MICHAELE. BAND ("Band Aff.," filed concurrently herewith). Pursuant to 
the foregoing, the City took ownership of the Golf Course "subject to and including 
rights of Grantor in" (1) the "Terms, conditions, provisions, easements and 
obligations set forth in that certain Permanent Easement Agreement" and (2) the 
"Terms, conditions, provisions, easements and obligations set forth in that certain 
Assignment and Assumption of Permanent Easement Agreement." See Exhibit 1 to 
DEED OF GIFT at 2. The dictionary definition of the phrase "subject to" is "[l]iable, 
subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed or affected by; provided 
that; provided; answerable for." Westrope & Associates v. Dir. of Revenue, 57 
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on Appeal" set on 
Appellants' AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL. Accordingly, this argument has been preserved for 
2. The issue of the interpretation of the terms of the Permanent Easement 
Agreement is properly before this Court because it was addressed by the 
District Court in the District Court's Memorandum Decision. 
The City argues that the issue of interpretation of the terms of the Permanent Easement 
Agreement is not properly before this Court because "nowhere in the district court's decision does it 
address the issue of the plain language of the agreement as it relates to interpretation of the width or 
scope of the license area." Respondent's Brief at 26. Again, Appellants to believe this to be an 
inaccurate statement. Specifically, the District Court, in its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ," R. 000680-
000697) addressed the meaning of the Permanent Easement Agreement as follows: 
If the Court were to conclude that the Agreement conveyed an easement appurtenant 
to Lot 4, the Court would have to conclude the Agreement granted the owner of Lot 
4 not only a right to use the servient tenement in a manner or for a purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner (An easement is 
defined as the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Akers v. D.L. White 
Const., Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 30 1, 127 P .3d 196, 204 (2005)), but also granted the 
owner of Lot 4 - and notably any owner of Lot 4 - the right to destroy a portion of 
the interest of the owner of the servient tenement by dedicating the roadway to the 
public. The right to dedicate the roadway to the public would be inconsistent with 
the rights of the owner of the servient estate. It would also diminish the rights of the 
owner of the dominant estate by forever altering the 'easement' he held to simply be 
a right of way available to the general public. The term of the Agreement giving 
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create a easement over 
wanted to build a road over one piece piece 
owned. In order to do that, it needed the permission of its tenant to make entry upon 
and make changes to the land while the tenant was in possession of that land. It also 
needed its tenant's permission to alter a portion of the leasehold in the future. Tee, 
Ltd., granted those permissions upon certain conditions and in exchange for certain 
promises. 
Id. at 15-16 (R. 000694-95). The District Court also concluded that "The language of the 
'PERMANENT EASEMENT AGREEMENT' is unambiguous." Id. at 16 (R. 000695) Appellants 
concede that the foregoing is not necessarily a discussion of the language of the Permanent Easement 
Agreement "as it pertains to the width" of the easement area, but it certainly pertains to whether or 
not the easement area can be expanded to meet the requirements of ACHD and then dedicated as a 
public road. Consequently, the issue of the interpretation of the terms of the Agreement is properly 
before this Court. 
3. The issue of whether parol evidence should be considered is properly before this 
Court because it was addressed by the Court in its Memorandum Decision Re: 
MSJ as well as its Memorandum Decision Re: Motions to Strike. 
The City argues that the issue of whether the District Court should have relied on extrinsic 
evidence is not before this Court because "[t]he District Court made no rulings on the issue of 
whether parol evidence should be considered and Boise Hollow has failed to point to any adverse 
ruling on this issue for this Court to review for error." Respondent's Brief at 3 0. Again, Appellants 
do not believe this to be a wholly accurate summary of the District Court's holding. 
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... defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter oflaw without interpreting 
the Agreement itseif. Therefore, the various averments about the intent of the parties 
and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Agreement are irrelevant. 
The affiants' and declarants' statements about themselves, their backgrounds, and 
their opinions are also irrelevant. 
Id. at 2 (R. 000675). 
However, the District Court also concluded that "The language of the 'PERMANENT 
EASEMENT AGREEMENT' is unambiguous." Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ at 16 (R. 
000695). The District Court further stated: 
As an independent ground for granting the defendant summary judgment, the Court 
finds that the unambiguous language of the Agreement itself makes clear that the 
parties did not intend to create an easement appurtenant to Lot 4. 
Id. at 13 (R. 000693). 
that: 
Concurrently, the District Court, in its Memorandum Decision Re: Motions to Strike noted 
Defendant has moved to strike certain statements contained in that affidavit largely 
on two grounds -that the statements are inadmissible because they are speculative or 
contain hearsay and that the statements are parole evidence that is inadmissible 
to determine the parties' intent when executing the Permanent Easement 
Agreement because the language of the Agreement is unambiguous. 
Memorandum Decision Re: Motions to Strike at 1-2 (R. 00674-75). 
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SECOND OF SANDERSON 000430-00043 
Consequently, the issue of whether the District Court should have relied on extrinsic 
evidence is properly before this Court. 
C. The City is estopped to deny that the Permanent Easement Agreement created and 
easement across Lot 1 in favor of Lot 4 because the City accepted the Deed of Gift 
conveying Lot 1 with knowledge of the existence of the easement and with the 
understanding that the easement and the Permanent Easement Agreement were both 
valid and enforceable. 
When the City acquired Lot 1 by Deed of Gift, it had, at a minimum, constructive knowledge 
of the Permanent Easement Agreement. 4 The Deed of Gift included a statement that Lot 1 was 
subject to the "terms, conditions, provisions, easements and obligations set forth in that certain 
Permanent Easement Agreement." R. 000618. 
It is axiomatic that "[a] grantee, who accepts a deed to the property granted, is estopped to 
deny the truth of a recital that the grantor had previously granted an easement or interest in the 
property to another person." Davis v. Auerbach, 78 Ga. App. 575, 580, 51 S.E.2d 527,532 (1949). 
As a general rule, all parties to a deed, and those claiming through, or under, them, 
are bound by the recitals therein legitimately appertaining to its subject matter. To 
put it another way, all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein, which 
operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land, and binding not only 
parties but privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law. Thus, recitals of 
4 The Permanent Easement Agreement was duly recorded with the Ada County Recorder on November 3, 1993, as Ada 
County Instrument No. 09392442 (R.000144-000155); the City acquired Lot I via Deed of Gift twenty years later, on 
November 1, 2013, which was subsequently recorded on November 4, 2013, as Ada County Instrument No. 113130306 
(R. 00613-20). 
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successors estate 
bind mere strangers or those who claim by 
31 C.lS. Estoppel and Waiver§ 43; see also 37 Robinwood Associates v. Health Indus., Inc., 47 
of its provisions is legally imputed to him; and, by its acceptance, he is bound by all of its provisions 
and is estopped to deny their legal effect."); Needham v. Caldwell, 25 Tenn. App. 189, 154 S.W.2d 
535,537 (1941); Gutensohn v. McGuirt, 1944 OK 161, 194 Okla. 64, 147 P.2d 777, 778; Erickson v. 
Wiper, 33 N.D. 193, 157 N.W. 592, 598 (1916); Hittinger v. Eames, 121 Mass. 539, 545 (1877). 
Likewise, "Where the owner ofland plats the same into lots, blocks, streets, and alleys, and 
files such plat with the proper recorder of deeds, and sells lots therein with reference to such plat, he 
and his grantees are estopped from revoking the dedication of such streets and alleys." Boise City By 
& Through Amyx v. Fails, 94 Idaho 840,845,499 P.2d 326,331 (1972) (quoting Boise City v. Hon, 
14 Idaho 272, 94 P. 167 (1908)). 
The City goes to some lengths in its brief to deny that Boise Hollow has an equitable 
servitude in favor of Lot 4 across Lot 1. Appellants do not so contend and did not assert this 
argument below. Rather, the purpose of the authority with respect to equitable servitudes in 
Appellants' Brief was merely to emphasize a critical concepts that play into the foregoing rule: [l] 
that "[a] purchaser is charged with every fact shown by the records and is presumed to know every 
other fact which an examination suggested by the records would have disclosed"; and [2] "[ o ]ne who 
purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in good faith." Kalange 
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Consequently, it is significant that the City took ownership of Lot 1 with knowledge of the 
existence of the easement and with the understanding that the easement and the Permanent Easement 
Agreement were both valid and enforceable. Having done so, the City is now estopped to suddenly 
deny the existence of an easement now that it has become convenient to do so. 
D. The only interpretation of the Permanent Easement Agreement which gives effect to 
both Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 6 is that the easement area may be expanded by Boise 
Hollow to meet ACHD's requirements and then be dedicated to ACHD as a public 
road. 
The City contends that Paragraph 6 of the Permanent Easement Agreement only allows the 
easement road to be brought to ACHD's specifications and dedicated to ACHD "if' ACHD's 
specifications can be met within the 40' easement area. Neither the language of the Permanent 
Easement Agreement nor the attendant circumstances support this interpretation. 
With respect to the particular language employed by the Permanent Easement Agreement, the 
City's argument is already addressed in Appellant's Brief at p. 35-36: 
The City argued below that because Paragraph 1 does not use the word "initial" and 
because Paragraph 6 does not include a word such as "expand," they cannot be 
interpreted so as to call for subsequent expansion of the easement area. Therefore, 
the City contends that Paragraph 6 "simply authorizes Boise Hollow to dedicate any 
potential future road ... if such road meets ACHD's then-current construction 
specification." R. 000243. 
However, the City's argument fails by its very own logic: Paragraph 1 does not 
contain words which express any prohibition on future enlargement. More 
importantly, Paragraph 6 does not contain the word "if' or any other language 
suggesting a contingency which must be met before the road can be constructed and 
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to to 
regardless of ACHD requirements at the time of its construction and dedication, the 
parties could easily have drafted a provision which stated that the roadway "shall not 
exceed 40' regardless of ACHD requirements for a roadway." That is not what the 
parties did. The plain language of Paragraphs 1 and Paragraph 6 do not employ any 
language whatsoever which wouid render the Grantees' right to construct and 
dedicate the road contingent upon ACHD accepting the 40' limitation. Accordingly, 
no such meaning may be inferred. 
Furthermore, the use and placement of the word "shall" is significant. The word 
"shall" denotes a mandate. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 100 Idaho 99, 102, 593 P.2d 
1003, 1006 (1979) ("This Court on several occasions has construed the word 'shall' 
as being mandatory and not discretionary.") The structure of the sentence is such 
that the subject ("Such road") must perform the verb ("shall meet") necessary to 
conform to the object ("all then existing ordinances and requirements ... "). 
Therefore, the state (i.e., the size) of the subject ("Such road") must necessarily be 
malleable in order to perform its directive. 
Appellant's Brief, 35-36 (emphasis in original). 
Moreover, the City's position does not make sense given the circumstances already existing 
at the time the parties entered into the Permanent Easement Agreement. As stated in the AFFIDAVIT 
OF DEAN BRIGGS 5 (R. 000172-000197), the parties were advised prior to executing the Permanent 
Easement Agreement that, while 40' would be sufficient for a private road, 40' was not then 
sufficient to meet ACHD' s specifications. See Briggs Aff. at 3-4(R.000174-75). Thus, according to 
the City, the parties expressly agreed to an impossible act (i.e., bringing the road up to ACHD's 
specs, which they were aware would be in excess of 40' in width, without exceeding 40' in width). 
5 The Briggs Aff. was not challenged by the City below, nor excluded by the District Court. Accordingly, it remains a 
vital part of the record on appeal. 
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contract 
233, P.2d (I "Apparently conflicting must be reconciled so 
as to give meaning to both, rather than nullifying any contractual provision, if reconciliation can be 
effected by any reasonable interpretation of the entire instrument." Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 
806, 10 P.3d 751, 755 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting 17A Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts§ 324 
(1999)). Should the Court adopt the City's interpretation, then the Court must also subscribe to the 
notion that Paragraph 6 had no meaning at the time it was drafted. On the other hand, Appellants' 
interpretation gives effect to both Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 6, allowing for the government of the 
former until the invocation of the latter. 
The most reasonable, logical, and plain interpretation of Paragraphs 1 and 6 of the Permanent 
Easement Agreement is Boise Hollow' s: V ancroft and Tee intended for V ancroft to own a 40 foot-
wide private road easement (being large enough to encompass the dirt road then existing) until such 
time as Vancroft chose to develop it, at which point it would be expanded to meet ACHD's 
requirements. 
E. The parties agree that the District Court must consider the parol evidence in the record 
to determine the intent of the parties to the Permanent Easement Agreement if this 
Court finds that the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous. 
Though the parties disagree about the meaning of the Permanent Easement Agreement, both 
the City and Appellants agree that the document is unambiguous and can be interpreted without 
resorting to parol evidence. 
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at 1033. In such case, the District by excluding the Arnold 
Aff., Connell and Second Sanderson Deel. from its consideration. The City contends that such 
a holding would necessitate remand back to the District Court with instructions to consider such 
evidence. Respondent's Brief at 31-32. Appellants agree. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the above-named Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully 
request that this Court reverse the District Court's ruling and instruct the District Court to enter 
its judgment in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellants as prayed for in Plaintiffs' FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2016. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, LLP 
By: -~=4--~?-====:>===-----
Michael E. Band, of the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Scott B. Muir 
Abigail R. Germaine 
Deputy City Attorneys 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
150 N. Capitol Blvd. 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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